Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1976

Frisco Joe's, Inc., Donald Vaughan Tolman and
Joaana Tolman v. Elis Y. Peay, Gordon Hall and
Kenneth Hostetter : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
S. Rex Lewis; Attorney for Donald V. Tolman; Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Richard L. Maxfield; Attorney for Gordon Hall and Kenneth Hostetter, Defedants-Responents;
Boyd L. Park; Sumsion and Park; Co-Counsel for Ellis Y. Peay, Defendant-Respondent; Cully Y.
Christensen; Co-counsel for Ellis Y. Peay, Defendant-Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Frisco Joe\'s, Inc. v. Peay, No. 197614515.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/333

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

AffAH
DOCUMENT
KfU
46.9
.S9
DOCKET NO.

UTAH StfMfcME COURT
BRIEF

Jj

SUPREME COURT

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY

STATE OF UTAH
14JUM1977

TRISCO JOES, INC., a Utah
corporation, DONALD VAUGHN
TOLMAN artd JOANNA TOLMAN,

J. Reufcca C:r.; L;i.v Scho§l

PlaintiffsAppellants,
Case No. 14,515

v.
ELLIS Y. PEAY, GORDON HALL,
and KENNETH HOSTETTER,
DefendantsRespondents.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANT'S
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT B|Y THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH, HONORABLE J. ROBERT BULLOCK, JUDGE
S. REX LEWIS, for:
, LEWIS & IJErai&BSEEl
120 Eist 300 North
Provo Utah 84601
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppe lants
CULLEN Y, CHRISTENSEN
55 East Center Street
Provo, Utah 84601
Co-counsel for Ellis Y. Peay,
Defendant-Respondent
80 North 100 East
Provo, Utah 84601
Co-counsel for Ellis Y. Peay,
Defendant-Respondent
RICHARD P- MAXFIELD
P. 0. BoJ^ 1097
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorney for Gordon Han and
Kenneth tfostetter,
Defendant-Respondents

r 11
JUN ?A 197S
Clerk* Suprcno C

\r*&

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRISCO JOES, INC., a Utah
corporation, DONALD VAUGHN
TOLMAN and JOANNA TOLMAN,
PlaintiffsAppellants,
Case No. 14,515

v.
ELLIS Y. PEAY, GORDON HALL
and KENNETH HOSTETTER,
DefendantsRespondents .

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT BY THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH, HONORABLE J. ROBERT BULLOCK, JUDGE
S. REX LEWIS, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants
CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN
55 East Center Street
Provo, Utah 84601
Co-counsel for Ellis Y. Peay,
Defendant-Respondent
BOYD L. PARK
80 North 100 East
Provo, Utah 84601
Co-counsel for Ellis Y. Peay,
Defendant-Respondent
RICHARD L. MAXFIELD
P. O. Box 1097
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorney for Gordon Hall and
Kenneth Hostetter,
Defendant-Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF FACTS
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT PEAY WAS
GUILTY OF FORCIBLE ENTRY.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT THE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF
THE PLAINTIFFS WAS CONVERTED BY ALL
OF THE DEFENDANTS.
POINT III
THE AWARD OF $1,250.00 FOR DELINQUENT
RENT WAS EXCESSIVE.
CONCLUSION
AUTHORITIES CITED
18 Am.Jur.2d, Conversion, §63
49 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord & Tenant, §323
49 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord & Tenant, §329
49

Am.Jur.2d, Landlord & Tenant, §575

Prosser, William, Law of Torts, p. 89
CASES CITED
Allred v. Hinckley,
nT3T8l

8 U . 2 d 7 3 , 328 P . 2 d

726

Freev/ay Park Building, Inc. v. Western Stores
Wholesale Supp1y, 22 U.2d 266, 451 P.2d
778 (1969)

Hyman v. Jockey Club, 9 Colo.App. 299, 48 P.
671 (1897)
Karp v. Nargolis, 159 Cal.App.2d 69, 323 P.2d
557 (1958)
King v. Firm, 3 U.2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955)
MacArthur v. Rostek, 483 P.2d 1351 (Colo.App.
1 9 7 1 )

Malcolm v. Little, 295 A.2d 711 (1972)
Kariani Air Producers v. Gill's Tire Market,
29 U.2d 291, 508 P.2d 808 (1973)
Paxton v. Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903
(1935)
Petersen v. Hodges, 21 Utah 72, 239 P.2d 180
(1951)
Petersen v. Piatt, 16 U.2d 330, 400 P.2d 507
(1965)
Telegraph Ave Corp. v. Raertsch, 269 P. 1109
Cal. S.C. 1928)
Winchester v. Becker, 4 Cal.App. 382, 88 P.
296 (1906)
STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §78-36-1

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRISCO JOES, INC., a Utah
corporation, DONALD VAUGHN
TOLMAN and JOANNA TOLMAN,
PlaintiffsAppellants ,
Case No. 14,515

v.
ELLIS Y. PEAY, GORDON HALL
and KENNETH HOSTETTER,
DefendantsRespondents .

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages arising out of the forcible
entry of the plaintiffs1 leased premises by the lessor, defendant
Ellis Peay.

It is also an action for conversion of the personal

property which was located in the building on the leased premises.
The conversion claim was made against all of the defendants.

Defen-

dant Peay counter-claimed for rent allegedly due and unpaid.
Defendants Hall and Hostetter counter-claimed against the plaintiff
and cross-claimed against defendant Peay to quiet title to the
personal property in question.

Hall and Hostetter also cross-

claimed against Peay for indemnification in the event any judgment
should be entered against them.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court, Judge J. Robert Bullock, presiding, dismissed
all claims with prejudice except that it entered judgment for
$1,250.00 for the defendant Peay against the plaintiff for the

past due rent and made no decision concerning the ownership of
the personal property in question.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have this Court reverse the trial court
and enter judgment against the defendants in the amount prayed
for the forcible entry by the defendant Peay and for the wrongful
conversion of the plaintiffs1 personal property by all of the defendants.

Plaintiffs also seek to have the award of past due

rent reduced from $.1250.00 to $554.80 as reflective of the actual
past due rent.
In the alternative, appellants ask that this Court reverse
the trial court with regard to the forcible entry and conversion
issues and to remand the case to the trial court for a determination
of the damages suffered by the plaintiffs.

Appellants also seek

the other relief listed above, as well as attorney's fees and the
costs of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In late December of 1974, Donald and Joanna Tolman purchased
all of the interest in Frisco Joe's, Inc., a corporation whose
sole activity has been the management of a restaurant in Provo,
Utah, which bore the name of the corporation.

The business

maintained the restaurant on leased premises which were owned by
the defendant Ellis Peay,

As part of the 1974 purchase, the

Tolmans purchased trade fixtures and other expensive personal
property, which were placed in the restaurant.
Donald Tolman negotiated a new lease of the property with
the defendant Peay, dated January 1, 1975.
~2-

The terms of that

lease provided that Tolman would pay $400.00 per month rent,
beginning on January 1, 1975.

The provisions of the lease provide

that a five day notice-tp-quit may be given if the rent is more
than fifteen days delinquent.

The lease also provided for a

$450.00 payment on March 15, 1975, as a deposit for the last
month's rent.

Tolman made the January rent payment but did not

make the February or March payments.
Because the business was unprofitable, Tolman closed it and
began looking for a purchaser v/ith the help of a real estate
agency.

On March 5, 19 76, Tolman had a discussion with defendant

Peay, the contents of which are disputed.

In any event, Tolman

continued in peaceful possession of the premises until March 12,
19 75.

On that date, Peay entered the premises and had a locksmith

come to change the locks on the building, thus excluding the
plaintiff from possession of the premises and the personal property
within the building.

Peay alleges that the lock-chainging was

done for the purposes of security but never explains the failure
to provide the plaintiffs with a key to the premises.
Respondents Hall and Hostetter subsequently leased the
premises from defendant Peay and purportedly entered into a
purchase contract for the personal property.

In early April of

19 75, plaintiff Tolman informed both Hall and Hostetter that he
owned the personal property in the restaurant.

They responded by

stating that they had purchased it from Peay and that Tolman
would have to solve any problems with him (Peay).
The defendants have never returned any of the personal
property belonging to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs have
never regained possession of the premises.

ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
Appellants1 contention on appeal is that the trial court
erred as a matter of lav; in failing to find that the above facts
constituted forcible entry by the defendant Peay and conversion
by all of the defendants.

Appellants believe that the Utah law

on these two subjects is clear and that the trial court was
simply incorrect in its holding.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT
PEAY WAS GUILTY OF FORCIBLY ENTRY.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in applying
the applicable Utah law of forcible entry to the facts as proven
by the clear weight of the evidence at trial.

The evidence

showed that respondent Ellis Peay took possession of the leased
property without the appellants' permission or without following
the legal requirements of Utah's Forcible Entry and Detainer Act,
U.C.A. § 78-36-1, et seq.

Appellants believe that the error

complained of in this appeal occurred in applying the pertinent
law to the facts in this case.
Utah law has clearly defined the method by which a landlord
may dispossess a tenant whom he believes to be in arrears on his
rent payments.

As stated in Freeway Park Building, Inc. v. Western

States Wholesale Supply, 22 U.2d 266, 451 P.2d 778 (1969), the
"forcible entry and detainer statute (§ 78-36-3, U.C.A., 1953)
provides a speedy and adequate remedy against a tenant who wrongfully is in possession of land.11

Pcixton v. Fisher, 86 Utah 408,

45 P.2d 903, 906 (1935) established that the forcible detainer
statute is the only alternative action open to a landlord other
-4-

than voluntary surrender of possession by the tenant:
Even rightful owners should not take the law into
their own hands and proceed to recover possession by
violence, or by entry in the nighttime, or during the
absence of the occupants of any real property.
Even contractual provisions between the parties do not override the requirements of proceeding in a court of law.

In King v.

Firm, 3 Utah2d 419, 285 P.2d 114, (1955) the lease under which
the case arose contained a provision giving the landlord the right
of re-entry upon the tenant's default in rent payment without
making a demand upon the tenant.

The court held that the landlord

could still not dispossess the tenant without his express permission:
Utah has enacted Forcible Entry and Detainer
Statutes and a landlord may not without the express
consent ofv a tenant repossess his property without
resorting to remedies provided in those statutes.
Id, at 1118.
In Petersen v. Piatt, 16 Utah2d 330, 400 P.2d 507 (1965), the
rule was stated even more clearly in the court's holding that
dispossession, unless consentual, must be effected by the statutory
means.

That case, which is almost exactly indentical to this

one, clearly shows that the defendant, Peay, was guilty of wrongful entry when he entered the premises, had the locks changed,
and took possession without permission.

The law of the case,

which was overlooked by the trial court in this case, is clearly
stated:
Our previous decisions construing our forcible
entry and detainer statute place a duty on a
person whether entitled to the real property in
question or not, to not use force or stealth or
fraud in obtaining possession of such realty.
Such forcible entry and detainer statute
creates a right in a person who is in actual
peaceable possession of such real property to a
cause of action against a person who, in his
absence, and without legal process, by force,
-5-

stealth or fraud, takes the possession of such
property from him.

Id, at 400 P.2d 508.

Despite the attempts at trial to justify Peay's behavior, it is
crystal clear under Utah lav; that the acts of the defendant Peay,
in dispossessing the plaintiffs of the leased premises, constituted
forcible entry as defined in Utah statute and case law.
As seen by the Delaware Court in Malcolm v. Little, 295 A.2d
711, 713 (1972), such statutes abrogate the common law right to
expel a holdover tenant without legal process:
The common lav/ rule that the landlord may expel
holdover tenants without process appears still to
be followed in several states. That appears to
have been the early rule in Delaware. State v.
Stansborough, 1 Del.Cas 129 and 428 (1797).
More recently, however, the courts of many states
have held that the enactment of forcible entry
and detainer statutes has modified the common
lav; and that the landlord, in order to dispossess
a tenant, must proceed by the statutes. Failure
to proceed by such means may result in the landlord being liable to the tenant in damages. See,
for example, Petersen v. Piatt, 16 U.2d 330, 400
P.2d 507 (1965)'; Ammo 6 ' ALR 3d 177 (1966).
The Utah Forcible Entry Statute has thus been clearly establishec
as being the exclusive alternative to consentual surrender of
leased or rented premises.

The elements and universal scope of

the statute were emphasized in Freeway Park Building, Inc. v. Western
States Wholesale Supply, 22 Utah2d 266, 451 P.2d 778, 781, (1969):
It says that "every person11 who does certain things
is guilty of forcible entry, etc. There is no
exception in the statute for one who may by contract
be authorized to enter, or for an owner who as a matter of law may have a right to the possession.
The facts in this case clearly support a finding of forcible
entry.

The terms of the lease provided for re-entry in case of

default in rent payment only with five days written notice.
...upon five (5) days written notice of such default
by the Lessor to the Lessees, the Lessor shall
-6-

have the right to re-enter or re-possess the leased
property,.. (Ex.11.).
It was never claimed at trial by defendant Peay

that

the

five day

written notice was given; in fact he admitted he did not give
that notice.

(R. 237). Thus, the repossession cannot be justified

under the terms of the lease, even if that were permitted under
the Forcible Entry Statute.
Nor can the repossession be justified by a claim of surrender
of the lease.

There is no evidence of an express surrender, and

evidence is inadequate to support a finding of a surrender by
operation of law.
exists.

No tangible evidence of an intent to surrender

The defendant Peay only alleges that there was an offer

to turn over the keys to the premises by Mr. Tolman.
were never delivered.

Those keys

Had a surrender truly been effected, there

would have been no need to change the locks and exclude the
rightful possessors.
The standard by which a claim of surrender must be measured
in Utah was set in Mariani Air Products v. Gill's Tire Market, 29
Utah2d 291, 508 P.2d 808, 810, (1973):
a surrender will not be implied against the intent of the parties, as manifested by their acts...
The burden is on the party, relying on a surrender
of a lease, to prove it; and the proof must be clear
where the surrender is to be inferred from circumstances inconsistent with the intention to perform.
(Emphasis added.)
The only evidence that would support a surrender by operation
of lav/ was given by Peay in his statement that Tolman wTas going
to turn the keys over to him.

(R. 275).

However, the keys, a

traditional emblem of surrender of a lease, were never transferred.
In that same part of his testimony, Peay indicated that he would
-7-

not accept a surrender of the lease when he recalled his saying
to Tolman:
...you are still on the lease and as long as we
don't have it leased to somebody else you are responsible for the lease on it. (R. 275).
Mr. Tolman ! s testimony shows that his intent was not to effect a
surrender; but merely to enlist Mr. Peay f s help in effecting a
sale of his business and an assigment of the lease.

Peay also

indicated in his testimony that he was going to help Tolman lease
the premises;
I said "All right, you take the keys and keep
them then, and as soon as you are through with
them I want you to bring them back to me so that
I can show it when these people come to rent it.
(R. 275).
The intent of both parties is thus made clear that there was no
surrender intended, and that the lease was regarded by both as of
full force.
Since there was no consentual surrender of the premises by
the tenants, the landlord's remedy is to proceed through the
forcible entry and detainer statute to regain possession.
was not done.

This

Instead, Peay changed the locks on the building

and made a new lease with defendants Hall and Hostetter.

(R. 236).

Peay is thus clearly guilty of a forcible entry under the statute.
His actions constitute a forcible entry by stealth under the Utah
statute.
Cases where dispossession has been effected by the changing
of locks are numerous in other jurisdictions, and those instances
have been found to be forcible entries, even under statutes
lacking the forcible entry by stealth provision.

California has

found entry with a key or by a locksmith to be forcible in many
-8-

cases.

Sete Karp.v. Margol.is, 159 CA2d 69, 323 P.2d 557 (1958)

and Winchester v. Becker, 4DA 382, 88 P. 296 (1906).
In the absence of any evidence establishing consentual
surrender of the premises, noting that the provisions of the
lease for repossession were not met, it is clear that Mr. Peay ! s
taking control of the premises was a forcible entry by stealth
under U.C.A. § 76-36-1.
The damages following such action are easily predictable.
Without an interest in the property, it would be practically
impossible to sell the personal property or the business itself
for any amount approximating the fair market value.

This is

accentuated by the difference in prices cited by Tolman at the
trial.

(R. 219).

For the above reasons, appellants believe it is obvious that
defendant Peay forcibly entered the premises possessed by the
plaintiffs and did so without legal right or justification.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE PERSONAL
PROPERTY OF THE PLAINTIFFS WAS CONVERTED BY ALL OF THE DEFENDANTS.
The Utah law of conversion has been succinctly summarized in
Allred v. Hinckley, 8 Utah2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (1958):
A conversion is an act of willful interference
with a chattel, done without lawful justification
by which the person entitled thereto is deprived
of its use and possession. The measure of damages
of conversion is the full value of the property.
For a conversion to be found, there must be a willful interference
with the possession and use of a chattel.

"Willful" is defined

as meaning a conscious act and 'interference1 means an act so
serious that the party so converting may be required to, in
-9-'

effect, purchase the goods.
The evidence was clear in this case that Peay assiuned control
of the goods allegedly converted.

Peay admitted that the equipment

and furnishings associated with the business were still in the
building at the time he changed the locks. (R. 292).
Hall also testified that he understood

Defendant

Peay owned the property

when he and Hostetter purchased the property:
Mr. Lewis
Mr. Hall

Mr. Hall

Did you purport to be purchasing that
Property?
We thought that was part of the building.
(R. 243, 244).
He was selling us the property as listed
in this agreement. I don't recall if he
came right out in the words "I own the
property," but in the agreement it said
that he was selling it to us. (R. 257).

Of course, Mr. Peay's action in changing the locks on the
building wrongfully deprived Tolman of his rightful use and
possession of the furnishings and equipment inside.

As Tolman

testified, it was also impossible for him to show the premises to
prospective buyers of his business.

(R. 213). Peay further

deprived Mr. Tolman of the use and possession of his property by
selling it to Hall and Hostetter.

A check drawn on their account

was given to Peay to cover an "equipment payment" of $200.00.
Peay admitted receiving the payment for the equipment.

(R. 237,

Ex. 14).
Peay claims he did not know of Mr. Tolman 1 s interest in the
property at the time he 'sold1 it to Hall and Hostetter and that
as soon as he became aware of his interest, he had them deal
directly with the Restaurant Stores and Equipment Co.

However,

under Utah law, even a bona fide seller of property is guilty of
-10-

conversion*

As stated in Allred v. Hinckley, 8 Utah2d at 76, 328

P..2d at 729 (1953):
A purchaser of stolen goods or an auctioneer who
sells them in good faith becomes a converter since
his acts are an interference with the control of the
property or in other words, a claiming of the ownership in such property and taking it out of the
possession of someone else with intention of excercising dominion over it is a conversion.
The essence of conversion is the interference with the property
of another, not the state of mind of the one claiming dominion
over the property.

Therefore, Hall and Hostetter are also guilty

of a conversion by reason of the same transaction.
Thus a bona fide purchaser of goods for value from
one who has no right to sell them becomes a converter when he takes possession of such goods.
Supra, at 729.
Conversion of the furnishings and equipment owned by Mr. Tolman
was made by Peay when he interfered with Tolman's use and possession
by locking him out of the building, and conversion was made by
Hall and Hostetter when they purchased and took possession of the
property in the transaction with Peay.

Peay's conduct was wrongful

in that he gained possession of the premises and property by a
wrongful eviction.
The defendants maintained at the trial that some sort of
formal demand is required in order to allege conversion.

It is

well established that no demand is necessary as a condition
precedent to a suit for conversion when the original taking of
the property is wrongful.
Generally, demand and refusal are unnecessary when
the act of the defendant amounts to a conversion
regardless of whether a demand is made. Thus, no
demand is necessary when the conversion results from
the defendant's securing possession of the property
illegally or tortiously... 18 AmJur.2d Conversion § 63.
-11-

No demand is necessary for the cause of action to accrue against
Mr. Peay; it accrued when he wrongfully excluded Mr. Tolman from
the leased property, and thus from his personal property*
Inasmuch as Mr. Hall and Mr. Hostetter were bona fide purchasers
for value, a demand is necessary for a suit to be brought against
them, with a refusal on thier part.
When there has been no wrongful taking or disposal
of the goods, and the defendant has merely come
rightfully into possession and then refused to surrender them, demand and refusal are necessary to
the existence of the tort. William Prosser, Law
of Torts, 89.
That the required demand v/as made of them, and that there
was a refusal to deliver the property was made is established by
testimony at the trial.

(R. 107-109).

Because the defendants willfully interfered with the chattels
of the plaintiffs within the legal meaning of those terms, the
trial court erroneously denied plaintiffs1 claims for conversion.
Because the facts produced at trial, including the admissions of
the defendants, clearly show conversion, the plaintiffs are
entitled to judgment from the defendant for the fair market value
of the property, which is the proper remedy under Utah law.
POINT III
THE AWARD OF $1,250.00 FOR DELINQUENT RENT WAS EXCESSIVE.
The terms of the lease agreement provided for payments of
$400.00 per month during the year 19 75.

The monthly payment was

to increase to $450.00 for the year 1976, and, consistent with
that provision, a payment for last month's rent was to become due
on March 15, 19 75.
The Lessees shall pay to the Lessor during the
original term of this lease...
-12-

Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) on or before the
1st day of January, 1975, the receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged, and $400.00 on or before
the first day of each month thereafter during the
entire year 1975...
Provided further that on or before the 15th day
of March, 1975, the Lessees shall pay to the Lessor
$450.00 which shall constitute payment for the
last month's rent under the terms of this lease.
(Ex. 11.)
That the first payment for January 19 75 was made is attested
to in the lease itself.

Tolman testified at the trial that he

had made the payment, and Peay also testified that he received
that payment.

( See Record 208, 273). The trial court found

that that payment had been made.

(R. 11).

The February payment was not made, again established by the
testimony of both Tolman and Peay.

(R. 102, 168). The same

testimony also established that a March payment was not made.
Mr. Tolman's liability for the March rent, however, was affected
by Peay's actions denying him access to the premises.

Evidence

established that Mr. Tolman was denied access to the premises on
March 12, 1975 by Mr. Peay, who had the locks changed.
and Mr. Peay both agreed on this in their testimony.

Mr. Tolman
(R. 213,

216, 277). The court's conclusion is consistent with that evidence
in finding the locks were changed as of that date.
Mr. Tolman is not liable for rent for the period following
his dispossession inasmuch as he was wrongfully excluded from the
premises.

It is a rule of long standing (see Hyman v. Jockey Club,

9 Colo.App. 299, 48 P. 671 (1897) that a tenant is not liable for
rent remaining in an unexpired term when there has been a wrongful
eviction.

49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord .& Tenant, §§ 323, 329.

Had the

rent for March been paid, the tenant Tolman could have maintained
-13-

an action in tort to recover the pro rata rent for the unexpired
term.

Tolman should thus be liable for 12/31 of the March rent

of $400.00; or $154.80.
On his counterclaim, defendant Peay was also awarded $450.00
as the amount due on March 15, 19 76 as a last month's rent.

This

would be duplicative of any amount awarded for March inasmuch as
March was the last month the lease was in effect.

The.award of

$450.00 as a last month's rent was clearly erroneous as being
duplicative.

The award of that amount was also improper since

that liability did nto accrue until the 15th of March, three days
after the effective termination of the lease.

Regardless of the

propriety of the eviction on the 12th, it is the rule that any
eviction suspends liability for rents accruing after the eviction.
49 Am.Jur2d Landlord & Tenant, § 575.

As ahs been said by the

Colorado court:
It is well settled that termination of the lease
agreement of eviction of the tenant by the landlord relieves the tenant from all liabilities to
accrue in the future including rent... MacArthur
v. Rostek, 483 P.2d 1351 (Colo.App. 1971).
The termination of the tenant's possession relieves him of further
liabilities to the landlord if that dispossession has been caused
by the landlord.

Here it is clear and admitted that Mr. Tolman

did not have access to the premises after the 12th of March when
the landlord (Peay) changed the locks on the building.

There

should not be any liability for payments accruing after that
date.

The reasoning behind the rule is simply the application of

the principle of quid pro quo.
The rule follows the general principle that any
act of the landlord which results in dispossessing
the tenant and which deprives him of the use, occupancy, and enjoyment of the premises amounts to
-14-

an eviction. The reason for the rule is that the
rent is the landlord's right to receive from the
tenant compensation for the benefits that are accruing to the tenant from his possession and enjoyment of land, and that, when the tenant is deprived
of this right of possession and enjoyment by the
action of the landlord to receive compensation
automatically ceases. Telegraph Ave. Corp. v.
Raentsch, 269 P. 1109, 1112, (Cal. S. C. 1928).
It is clear that any finding that established that Mr. Tolman
was excluded from the premises as of March 12, 19 75 demands that
no liability be placed on him for rents accruing after that date.
The same effect would occur if a surrender of the lease was
found.

Petersen v. Hodges, 239 21 Utah 72, 239 P.2d 180 (1951).

In summary, liability for February, 1975, may be imposed in
the amount of $400.00.
be $154.80.

For March, 1975, the amount owing would

Rent is not due for the remainder fo March due to

Mr. Peay's wrongful eviction of Mr. Tolman.

The payment which

would have accrued on the 15th of March is not collectible because
the payment would duplicate the payment for March rent and also
because that liability had not accrued when possession was denied
Tolman.
CONCLUSION
The fact of this case clearly show that the defendant Peay
was guilty of forcible entry and that all of the defendants
converted

the

personal

property

of

the

plaitniffs.

Appellants

believe that the clear weight of the evidence at trial showed the
requisite facts to establish these causes of action and that the
trial court simply erred in applying Utah law to the facts.
Because of the clarity of the law and because the defendants'
acts clearly fit within the limits of the behavior prohibited by
that law, appellants ask that this Court reverse the trial court
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and enter judgment as previously set forth in this brief•
Respectfully submitted this

IQ*"** day fo June, 19 76.

s.

S. REX LEWIS, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants,
to Cullen Y. Christensen, Co-counsel for Ellis Y. Peay, DefendantRespondent, 55 East Center Street, Provo, Utah 84601; Boyd L.
Park, Co-counsel for Ellis Y. Peay, Defendant-Respondent, 80
North 100 East, Provo, Utah 84601; and Richard L. Maxfield,
Attorney for Gordon Hall and Kenneth Hostetter, Defendant-Respondents,
P. O. Box 1097, Provo, Utah 84601, this //)JM

day of June, 1976.
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